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Bioconservative commentators argue that parents should
not take steps to modify the genetics of their children
even in the name of enhancement because of the
damage they predict for values, identities and
relationships. Some commentators have even said that
adults should not modify themselves through genetic
interventions. One commentator worries that genetic
modifications chosen by adults for themselves will
undermine moral agency, lead to less valuable
experiences and fracture people’s sense of self. These
worries are not justified, however, since the effects of
modification will not undo moral agency as such. Adults
can still have valuable experiences, even if some prior
choices no longer seem meaningful. Changes at the
genetic level will not always, either, alienate people from
their own sense of self. On the contrary, genetic
modifications can help amplify choice, enrich lives and
consolidate identities. Ultimately, there is no moral
requirement that people value their contingent genetic
endowment to the exclusion of changes important to
them in their future genetic identities. Through weighing
risks and benefits, adults also have the power to consent
to—and assume the risks of—genetic modifications for
themselves in a way not possible in prenatal genetic
interventions.
Some commentators regard the prospect of genetic-
ally enhanced human beings as not only desirable
but inevitable. Allen Buchanan has said that there is
no realistic prospect of stopping the development
of genetic and other kinds of enhancement (p.11–
2).1 Not only that, some commentators have made
the case that genetic enhancement may be morally
obligatory if and when safe and effective techniques
emerge to confer protection from disorders or
other benefits on children.2 Despite this enthusiasm
for genetic enhancement, certain commentators
continue to object to the use of genetic interven-
tions to shape the traits of children with regard to
sex, intelligence and athletic ability, among other
things. The claim that prenatal genetic interven-
tions wrongfully constrain the choices of descen-
dants pervades bioconservative outlooks in
bioethics.3 Commentators in this camp argue vari-
ously that such interventions are unnecessary, that
they change the terms of our relationships to one
another and that they even undermine the possibil-
ity of moral equality.4 5
By contrast to a focus on descendants, Peter
Herissone-Kelly argues that genetic interventions
chosen by and for oneself for the purpose of
enhancement are even more objectionable than
those for children.6 This analysis is out of the ordin-
ary precisely because it focuses on self-modification
rather than modification of individual children or
future generations as a whole. What makes this ana-
lysis worth attention from a moral point of view is
the objection to the effects of genetic modification
for the people who would choose those interven-
tions for themselves. Herissone-Kelly maintains that
the enhanced capacities that might emerge from
such genetic interventions diminish moral agency,
diminish the worth of outcomes the interventions
make possible and alienate people from their own
experiences. To the contrary, I will show that moral
agency survives genetic modifications, that out-
comes of experiences after genetic modifications are
still meaningful and that people can integrate
genetic modifications into their lives in ways that do
not necessarily alienate them from their experiences.
The capacity for assuming the risks of one’s choices
adds a supporting rationale to the defence of genetic
self-modification.
THE CASE AGAINST GENETIC MODIFICATIONS
Erosion of moral agency
Taking his cues from Jürgen Habermas,
Herissone-Kelly says that ‘for autonomy or agency
to be a possibility for us, we must regard our
natures as simply given, rather than manufactured’
(p.204).6 To make this point, Herissone-Kelly gives
the example of someone using motorised leg braces
to run a 4-min mile. He sees such a performance as
virtually involuntary, and he sees the effects of
genetic modifications as equivalent to the effect
of motorised leg braces, so far as the diminishment
of personal agency is concerned: ‘If an action were
to issue from a wholly chosen capacity, we would
be unable to regard that action as our own’
(p.206).6 Even if one wanted to allow that there
were some measure of choice involved in deciding
to run the race, Herissone-Kelly discounts the
importance of that choice: he is still ‘tempted to
say’ that ‘an alien capacity is responsible’ (p.206).6
In other words, moral agency is the condition of
the possibility of responsibility for our actions.
Genetic modifications undercut that agency and
therefore our responsibility for the resulting actions
that, in a sense, happen to us rather than being the
effects of choice.
The value of our behaviour
Not only would genetic modifications compromise
moral agency, they would undermine the value of
the behaviour they make possible. Herissone-Kelly
puts the matter this way: ‘part of the point of
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[actions] being performed is not simply that they should be rea-
lized but that they should be carried out by the agent who per-
forms them’ (p.206).6 In his view, the meaning of a 4-min mile,
for example, would be undercut if genetics were the engine of
success. Because the outcomes of genetic interventions would be
more or less involuntary, they would be relatively valueless as
accomplishments. By contrast, running a race without braces or
genetic modifications renders the event meaningful relative to its
accomplishment measured against our unknown genetic capaci-
ties (p.205).6
Bystander to one’s life
Herissone-Kelly also thinks that genetic modifications would
alienate the self from the events they make possible. For
example, he says that someone who runs a 4-min mile—because
of a genetic modification—can only look at that outcome as an
event external to oneself: ‘because the enhanced capacity does
not grow out of [the] given self. . . its presence will be experi-
enced as discontinuous with the self for which we have taken
responsibility’ (p.207).6 Herissone-Kelly says further that ‘There
will be little difference, from my perspective, between my
enhanced self running the mile and its being run by someone
else entirely’ (p.206).6 He thinks this alienation would attach to
other outcomes achieved in the wake of genetic modification so
that genetic modifications will, to put this in my own language,
transform one into a perpetual bystander to the events of one’s
life. (Since children would experience prenatal modifications as
given, as experientially always part of their selves, they would
not face the problem of a divided self, unlike adults who could
only see their changed circumstances in relation to their prior
traits and capacities) (p.208–09).6
In a way, this line of analysis might be construed as continu-
ous with the claim that genetically-effected outcomes will seem
less valuable than outcomes achieved against the background of
a contingently given nature. It seems worth pursuing the idea
that genetic self-modifications will lead to outcomes necessarily
perceived as ‘external to oneself ’ because this kind of claim
requires sorting events in one’s life on the basis of their com-
parative value and on the basis of their authenticity as an
expression of one’s self. Herissone-Kelly says enough along
these lines to justify this interpretation.
I will show that Herissone-Kelly’s objections to genetic self-
modification fail because they fail as acceptable interpretations
of the meaning of genetic self-modification.
MY RESPONSIBILITY, OUTCOMES VALUABLE TO ME
AND MY SENSE OF SELF
Erosion of moral agency: reply to the objection
When it comes to assigning responsibility for action,
Herissone-Kelly criticises certain advocates of enhancement for
genetic reductionism. He wants to temper the enthusiasm for
genetic enhancement through reminders that genetic modifica-
tions cannot be expected to confer benefits inevitably and neces-
sarily. Yet, at times, Herissone-Kelly also oversimplifies the
outcomes of genetic modification in his case to magnify the
extent to which the modifications detract from individual
responsibility (p.202).6 For example, he mentions prenatal
genetic modifications intended to confer athletic gifts, while
cautioning that these modifications would not determine the
person’s entire life history since the affected person might
choose another life altogether (p.202).6 That caution notwith-
standing, most of the examples he offers in objection to genetic
modification more or less presuppose a strong genetic determin-
ism and therefore a necessary erosion of responsibility. For
example, Herissone-Kelly mentions running a 4-min mile,
earning a degree, doing a Times crossword puzzle in 5 min and
doing high quality philosophical work. In the example of the
crossword puzzle, he cedes that someone would be responsible
for that outcome ‘in the sense that she alone decides to exercise
her newly acquired capacity.’ Yet he immediately goes on to say
that ‘there is another sense in which she is not responsible for
its having been finished so quickly,’ as if genetic modification
must eventuate in that outcome (p.206).6 Herissone-Kelly at
one point stipulates that the effects he puts into question are
those that follow from ‘a wholly chosen capacity.’ In other
words, without the genetic modification, the effect in question
could not happen at all. The idea that ‘a wholly chosen capacity’
can originate in a genetic modification presupposes a genetic
determinism that Herissone-Kelly himself elsewhere says is
inconsistent with what we know about genetics, namely that
genetics are not destiny.
At one point, Herissone-Kelly presents an example of making
all the genetic modifications (and not just for increased intelli-
gence alone) necessary to enhance ‘to have the full range of
capacities responsible for high quality philosophical work’
(p.205–06).6 Even granting rather direct linkages between
genetic modifications and behaviour, the prospect of doing high
quality philosophical work requires mastery of a certain body of
work and analytic skills that emerge only from education and
socialisation, which involve factors that are logically independ-
ent of genetic modifications. Whatever genetic modifications
can do for someone, they cannot engineer anyone as philosoph-
ically learned. This is to say that outcomes do not flow from
capacities in any causally determinate way, certainly not without
contextual influence.7 In this indeterminacy, there is plenty of
room for the exercise of moral agency.
When it comes to the effect of prenatal genetic modifications
on moral agency, Herissone-Kelly rejects the idea that prenatal
interventions would—as Habermas indicates—limit the ability
of children to take responsibility for themselves, since responsi-
bility turns on responsiveness to the presence of a trait, not its
origin. By contrast, however, he argues that adults could only
see the effects of genetic interventions as an erosion of their
agency. However, not only does context necessarily influence
behaviour in ways that defy genetic reductionism, the contin-
gency of experiences and choices during life preserves moral
agency.8 While people can expect—probabilistically speaking—
that genetic modifications will open certain outcomes to them,
people who choose genetic modifications for themselves will
have just as much contingency in their lives as would be the case
as if they had no modifications. One can only ever respond to
one’s circumstances, no matter whether one’s genetics were con-
stituted entirely by chance or partly by design.
This point can be made in the following way. Suppose one of
two monozygotic ‘identical’ twins is genetically modified in a
way known to increase intelligence in adulthood, but the other
twin undergoes no modification. As twin siblings often do, these
twins may share the same familial, education and social environ-
ment. Against this background, the modified twin faces no
fewer circumstances for choice—in matters great and small—
than the unmodified twin. No diminution in the need for
choice follows in the wake of genetic modification. Unless one’s
capacities are altogether moulded by the genetic modifications
into the equivalent of involuntary instincts, human agency and
contingency enough in one’s circumstances will survive the
influence of genetic modification. The indeterminacy of one’s
circumstances is enough to preserve responsibility for one’s
actions. Genetic modifications might even arguably increase
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responsibility by expanding the range in which one could
express a choice, such as might happen in the case of increased
intelligence.
The value of our behaviour: reply to the objection
Will people value the outcome of their choices less because
genetic modifications diminish a sense of responsibility? The
ranks of those who have run a 4-min mile are small enough;
fewer still have run a mile in less time. The ranks of both camps
would swell if motorised leg braces were available to all, which
would essentially cheapen the accomplishment, but that 4-min
mile might still be meaningful and valuable outside competitive
races. If I have to cross a mile-long field numerous times a day, I
might want to do this in a series of 4-min leg-braced runs rather
than lose the time involved in walking. Some people might
simply enjoy the experience of a 4-min mile, no matter that it is
accomplished through motorised leg braces. The value of a
modification can only be measured relative to a standard, and it
does not follow that modifications should be measured only in
contexts in which a strong sense of responsibility is presupposed
as a condition of the outcome being valuable. One might want
to enhance musical abilities late in life, not to compete musically
with others but to be better situated to offer music lessons to
children as a way to earn some income. Genetic modifications
to intelligence late in life might help offset the losses in cogni-
tive function that are the effects of senescence. I cannot see how
these outcomes, instrumentally valuable as they are, should be
interpreted as a morally valueless simply because they were
achieved with the help of genetic modification.
Throughout his analysis, Herissone-Kelly also seems to think
that one’s goals must remain static. If everyone had access to
motorised leg braces, competitive interest in achieving a 4-min
mile with their use would vanish, but with braces locked on
people could set about achieving new racing goals. One could
similarly move the goal posts for any capacity enhanced by
genetic modifications, both personally and socially. If I turn to
genetic modifications to improve my capacity to learn a new lan-
guage, for example, not only will I master that language more
quickly than I would have otherwise, but I may be able to set
my sights higher. In addition to learning Portuguese, I might
add other Latinate languages as well. One will always have—one
can only have—choices in relation to one’s capacities, no matter
how genetic modifications enlarge them. This is to say that
genetic modifications may close down some prior achievements
as valuable, but achievements valuable to one’s self remain pos-
sible in principle.
Bystander to one’s life: reply to the objection
In addition to worries about erosion of responsibility and dimin-
ishment of value, Herissone-Kelly also thinks that genetic modi-
fications will alienate people from their experiences. The events
of one’s life will happen at a distance, so to speak, from one’s
own identity. I think Herissone-Kelly’s account skews likely
meanings of genetic modifications and that it is not at all clear
that genetically modified people must interpret their accom-
plishments as external to their own identities.
Contrary to all we know about language acquisition, suppose
genetic modifications could implant a fully-functional capacity
for a specific language (let’s say German) in someone (let’s say
Smith) over the course of a few days. Smith might need some
transition period to his new-found skills as he plumbs the
powers of his new capacity. Early on, he might hesitate moment-
arily as he ventures into the thickets of German pronunciation
and syntax, not expecting to find them at the ready, but quickly
enough he will achieve confidence and fluency. With his
new-found language skills, must Smith stand in some kind of
alienated relationship to his capacities and achievements? If
Smith has no occasion to exercise his new capacity to speak
German, I suspect he would hardly notice the difference
between his prior self and his current self. If he were only to
speak German afterward, I suspect his own prior image of
himself would give way to a new self-image that integrates his
new fluency with his prior non-fluency. After all, most of us can
scarcely recall our limited powers of language as juveniles; we
do not ordinarily look back on our juvenile language skills as
evidence of a bifurcated identity.
Herissone-Kelly himself has disputed Habermas’ contention
that genetically modified children might experience the lives as
third-person observers, saying that ‘we have been given no com-
pelling reason to suppose that this must happen’ (p.209).6 Yet,
Habermas argues the inward nature of the intervention could
obstruct any direct perception of children’s experiences as modi-
fied; they could have no first-person way to know of that modi-
fication. Habermas also admits that children might never learn
about their modification if, for example, their parents never dis-
closed the intervention. (This is not too difficult to accept since
some parents do not disclose the use of donor gametes or even
surrogate mothers to children conceived and gestated that way.9)
Since children would experience prenatal modifications as
given, as experientially always part of their selves, it would be
hard to argue that the problem of a divided sense of self is
necessarily their fate (p.208–09).3
Is such an outcome possible for adults? Herissone-Kelly does
not think so; he argues that the person ‘who goes in for self-
sanctioned enhancement will retain an observer perspective on
her enhanced self, simply because she has been compelled to
take up that perspective in order to sanction the enhancement
in the first place’ (p.209).6 In other words, someone must per-
ceive the lack of a trait or capacity in oneself in order to see
modification as desirable in the first place. According to
Herissone-Kelly, achieving that trait or capacity by genetic modi-
fication will not extinguish the prior sense of having a deficit. In
this way, he thinks one will or must retain an observer perspec-
tive on the effects of the modification, no matter their scope or
value. Even if this were true, I see no reason to attribute much
significance to this changed image of self. People’s capacities
change over their lives without necessarily requiring current
‘selves’ to see former ‘selves’ as alienated states.
At present, some people are immune to HIV infection for
genetic reasons, but the vast majority of people in the world
have no such immunity.10 Those who are not immune may act
in ways that protect against HIV infection, but these practices
are sometimes difficult to observe, and involuntary exposures
can occur too. Suppose a genetic intervention could confer
immunity to HIV infection for an adult under all circumstances?
As Herissone-Kelly tells it, the conferral of genetic immunity on
oneself would mean that HIV protection would have been
achieved as if it were an event external to oneself (p.207).6
What would be lost in this genetic immunity would be the
opportunity for a conscious and life-long effort to avoid HIV
infection. By contrast to this account, I myself would prefer to
have lifelong immunity against this infection rather than have to
practice lifelong and fallible vigilance. I very much doubt that
after this genetic modification I would experience nostalgia for
my prior vulnerability to infection. I would not either feel that I
was now living out someone else’s life or my own life under a
materially altered sense of self. If I were somehow accidentally
exposed to HIV, I do not think I would be alienated by the
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protection conferred on me by a genetic modification, as if that
outcome were an outcome achieved by someone else entirely.
On the contrary, I would be more than grateful for having pro-
tection against HIV that is stronger than my own resolve to
protect myself from voluntary exposures and stronger than my
ability to protect myself from involuntary exposures.
Herissone-Kelly describes outcomes that are mined out of an
unmodified genetic nature as a realisation of the potential of
that nature (p.209).6 But why should we assume that a person’s
nature as given by a roll of the genetic dice must express some-
one’s identity in a more morally significant sense than the traits
and capacities to which a person aspires and—sometimes—
achieves? After all, many of one’s given traits and capacities can
be experienced as alienating, especially diseased and disordered
conditions that are also the realisation of one’s given nature.11
As against assuming that a valuable life consists only in realising
the potentiality of a contingent nature, we should cede that that
overcoming perceived deficits through genetic modifications
may do more to consolidate a sense of identity—and a valuable
identity at that—than to deconstruct it.
CONCLUSIONS
If it becomes possible to bring about modifications to oneself
through genetic modifications, I think bioconservativism faces a
formidable burden of proof: why should people not be able to
consent to modifications that are important to them? Even now
we take significant steps to modify the bodies that are the epi-
phenomena of given genetic endowments in order to express
values and identities. The searching philosophical question here
is why people should be required to remain only as their genetic
endowments—contingent in nature—have left them.
Contrary to the bioconservative view that choosing genetic
modifications for one’s self is even more morally problematic
than choosing to intervene in ways that affect descendants, we
can with clear moral conscience pursue those changes—as they
become possible—in order to express values and identities
important to us, evaluating those modifications on a case by
case basis. The indeterminacies of life are such that we remain
responsible beings who will still have to navigate the choices
that life brings our way, even if we were to modify our own gen-
etics. Genetic interventions need not either ‘undermine the
point of the actions we use [our] capacities to perform, wher-
ever those actions involve reflexive agency, that is, wherever it
matters to us that we are responsible for those actions or
outcomes’ (p.209).6 There is no reason to believe that our goals
must remain static either; as our traits and capacities change, we
will not necessarily value prior choices in the same way, but we
can move on to new goals as we explore the meaning of those
changes in the pursuit of meaningful lives.
A further consideration distinguishes genetic modifications
for adults as against children: the capacity to consent.
Bioconservative critics claim that prenatal interventions are
objectionable because human descendants cannot consent to
them.3 5 By contrast, adults are able to consent in ways that are
not possible in prenatal interventions, and they are also able to
assume risk as part of that consent, as they do when pursuing
aesthetic surgeries, for example. Aesthetic surgery is, in fact,
open to many of the same charges that Herissone-Kelly lays at
the feet of genetic modifications: it has outcomes that could be
called involuntary, it could lead to a devaluation of the out-
comes that are possible through one’s modified nature, and it
could alienate people from the effects of their new traits and
capacities. Yet, to judge from the way people have voted on aes-
thetic surgery with their feet (and their breasts, noses and
chins), most people have no fundamental objection to moving
their bodies into line with their values.
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